Dan Flies on Wittgenstein's Kite!
As I’ve mentioned in previous posts on my art and life blog and on my web site, I have a keen interest in the work of the Austrian Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. His explorations into the limits of language, so eloquently persued in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, have had a direct impact on my work throughout the years.
A book was recently published entitled “Wittgenstein Flies a Kite: A Story of Models of Wings and Models of the World” The book was written by Susan G. Sterrett, an assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duke University. It is an exciting and insightful look into the history and development of aeronautics and Wittgenstein’s pursuit of the limits of language in his “Tractatus.” It is also an engaging and additionally insightful example of the creative process. A book I would highly recommend to anyone interested in the topics I’ve mentioned. I wrote to professor Sterrett and she was kind enough to take the time to read a couple of essays on my web site that were directly related to some of the ideas in her book and responded in a very positive manner to my interest in her topic.
Anyway…Professor Sterrett’s insight’s has rekindled my interest in one of Wittgenstein’s principal questions as to how “picturing” and “similarity correspondence” relates to his ideas on language. My own understanding of those ideas, as I have pursued them in painting, and how they relate to visual metaphor, expression and communication, has led me to some new images. And…I would like to share them with you.
The two images below stem from a popular visual conundrum, the neckercube, that I used in an attempt to try and establish an argument about simultaneity and Wittgenstein's views on the limits of language while writing my MFA thesis at the University of Chicago in 1977. Leaving all pretensions aside as to how an approach as seemingly intellectual as all this may seem, along with the expertise needed to approach such a huge philosophical problem in language, suffice to say that this is how I PLAY!
As I wait for my project for McCormick place in Chicago to begin, I see these initial ideas as some new work to be pursued in the near future; as paintings, prints, and drawings. Consider these the kernels of a new approach to my work. I hope you will enjoy them.
A book was recently published entitled “Wittgenstein Flies a Kite: A Story of Models of Wings and Models of the World” The book was written by Susan G. Sterrett, an assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duke University. It is an exciting and insightful look into the history and development of aeronautics and Wittgenstein’s pursuit of the limits of language in his “Tractatus.” It is also an engaging and additionally insightful example of the creative process. A book I would highly recommend to anyone interested in the topics I’ve mentioned. I wrote to professor Sterrett and she was kind enough to take the time to read a couple of essays on my web site that were directly related to some of the ideas in her book and responded in a very positive manner to my interest in her topic.
Anyway…Professor Sterrett’s insight’s has rekindled my interest in one of Wittgenstein’s principal questions as to how “picturing” and “similarity correspondence” relates to his ideas on language. My own understanding of those ideas, as I have pursued them in painting, and how they relate to visual metaphor, expression and communication, has led me to some new images. And…I would like to share them with you.
The two images below stem from a popular visual conundrum, the neckercube, that I used in an attempt to try and establish an argument about simultaneity and Wittgenstein's views on the limits of language while writing my MFA thesis at the University of Chicago in 1977. Leaving all pretensions aside as to how an approach as seemingly intellectual as all this may seem, along with the expertise needed to approach such a huge philosophical problem in language, suffice to say that this is how I PLAY!
As I wait for my project for McCormick place in Chicago to begin, I see these initial ideas as some new work to be pursued in the near future; as paintings, prints, and drawings. Consider these the kernels of a new approach to my work. I hope you will enjoy them.
posted by Lhombre at 11:33 AM
18 Comments:
Patrick: You once inferred to Wittgenstein’s “misery” as a ghost that he carried within him. I have no reason to believe that you are incorrect in that perception of his psychological disposition.. However, as in the case of all of us who are human, we have many options ( pills for depression, counseling, suicide,) as ways to come to terms with those “ghost’s.” My sense of Wittgenstein the human being is prejudiced with a belief that the Tractatus, with all the epistemological questions it may raise, nevertheless exemplifies a search for some kind of truth that enables human suffering to be alleviated. That we may, as humans, sometime attempt to shoot bees with a howitzer, doesn’t necessarily mean we were wrong in the attempt. In fact, to come to terms with what may have been our inaccuracies in the past by refuting a former belief can also be read as the cure for what ails s. Or at least a step closer. I should add that I didn’t find Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, as well as a number of other attempts at truth, as interesting as his pursuit in the Tractatus.
Yes, of course I am aware that Wittgenstein refuted the Tractatus. It is not the speculative nature of the conclusions that interest me. What interests me is what I see as an incredible process of imagination and creativity that can touch on various aspects of living a life and feeling fulfilled. One could easily look at the Tractatus as analogous to the neckercube itself. Depending on the position you want to focus from will yield a result consistent with that perception. I have chosen over the years to leave myself open to at least two different positions regarding the Tractatus; 1) the logical extension toward some kind of truth and 2) the questions it raises in the areas of ontology, phenomenology, and epistemology, all of which interest me in my attempt to understand what I do. Let’s call it “Dan’s Ghost,”
I am very pleased that you would take the time to look at my blog. As an artist I have no pretensions as to my knowledge in the field of philosophy. It does not dissuade me, however, from philosophizing as to the value of the philosophy of others, Wittgenstein, et al.
I mentioned Professor Sterrett’s book “Wittgenstein Flies a Kite…” as an example of what I think is an interesting and insightful look into the “picture” theory of the Tractatus. I hope that you will give yourself the opportunity to read it. I would be very curious as to your thoughts. Thank you again. I enjoy your site very much. Perhaps I should begin to comment from time to time.
Patrick: Thank you for getting back to me. You bring up a number of very interesting observations ( Is it safe to assume you have read Monk's Bio. on W?) and insights. I would likke to address a few of them. At the moment I am tied up with trying to recover some work from customs that I did in Spain this past year. But I definitely would liike to respond to some of the issues you raise. And I will...soon.
I have been in communication with Susan Sterrett. She has been extremely gracious and has responded to some of the responses I had to her book. She was also very gracious to take the time to drop by my web site and read a couple of reviews of my work that refer to my interest in W. I wrote to her today about your response to my blog post. She is busy at the moment getting prepared to teach at Duke for the upcoming semester. She did say that she would take a look at what you mentioned as to W recanting his earlier views on "picture theory" in the Tractatus.
I do hope you have a chance to read her book. As I said in my response to you, I would be very interested in what you have to say.
Also, at some point in time I will respond to your perception of Jackson Pollock. I think we have differing views on his approach to his work. I look forward to talking to you soon. Thanks again for getting back to me. I hope you will stay in touch.
You don't sound much like any truck driver I ever met.
Thanks for the thoughtful comments you recently left on my blog.
My son was a History and Philosophy major and talks about Wittgenstein all the time. He loves 'Wittgenstein's Poker.'
I'll send a link to this post his way.
Mark Daniels
Mark: Thanks for dropping by. Yes, "Wittgestein's Poker" is an interesting peek into W's personality as well as his philosphy. I studied with one of the philospohers metioned in the book, Stephen Toulmin who was a student of W's. Toulmin taught at the University of Chicago in the Commiittee on Social Thought. He co-autored a wonderful book on W and the cultural millieu entitled "Wittgenstein's Vienna." I highly recommend it if your son hasn't already read it.
Mark: Yikes! Forgive the typo's! I apologize.
1) Patrick, I took the liberty of posting my comment on your site on my site as well . If anyone is reading this it would be kind if they have some idea of what we are in dialogue about I know of at least two who are interested. We’ll see where it goes.
I to feel like we are starting to communicate but beware, I have no formal education in philosophy but I have read much and am very passionate about it, especially W. While in grad school at The University of Chicago I did study and have a short social relationship with the noted philosopher of science Stephen Toulmin , a a former student of W’s. As well as some classes with Leonard Linsky a W scholar from the University of Chicago. I don’t believe one learns by osmosis so I have no pretensions about my qualifications.
One of the things I would like to get to is your comment on “intention.” Something in Susan Sterret’s book regarding “modeling” and the “court room model,” really caught my attention. Eventually!
I am still in the process of working things out with customs as to my shipment from Spain as well as working on a private commission so I will be a little slow responding at times.
2) Response to "Wittgenstein Two."
Hola! I just posted this on your site. I also posted that the first line in my response quotes your article as saying "my mind." That was incorrect since you actually said "the" mind. I acknowledged that error but also stated that it doesn't change my thoughts. Sorry about the typo's too! My darn keys seem to double up a lot of letters. I probably need to change the speed for typing on my keyboard; as well as spell more carefully!
OK. I'm going to give this a shot. I had Pollock on my mind when I entered your site...but, that can wait.
When you ended your observation with "my mind," which I take to mean Patrick's mind, I couldn't help but wonder if you are willing to acknowledge that W's mind probably works a little different. My understanding, from strictly a layman's point-of-view, is that W's reasoning behind "two" as you described is an extension of his refutation of Russell's "Theory of Types." When you elaborate on your position you describe a string of classes that resembles very closely Russell's view I think. Your position seems much closer to the idea of "logical constants" of the type that is a characterization of Russell’s Types. It leads, as I think I hear your explanation, to an ad infinitum result, which W is trying very hard to dismiss as finally leading to nothing. Certainly not to any truth that might be inferred from some initial premise. The logic that W pursues, by necessity, demands a much clearer example of what he (W) means by two, not what someone like Russelll, who I think woud have shared your observation, might mean by two. I believe you know that Russell accepted W dismissal of his "Theory of Types."
At some point in time I would like to use the "Theory of Types" as an anology as to how "Not" to view Pollock. Now there is where some real "imagining has taken place in our culture. Obviously I would have to characterize "Type" in some semantical leap that I think some art historians thrive on!
I really like your site!
Patrick: I hear you saying things like "experience, seeing, and imagination." My first response is that they are very subjective positions; all of which may differ from mine.
I remember the first time I saw a "soft" sculpture by the artist Claes Oldenberg. Actually there were two; one was of an electric fan over 12 feet high, made of a very flexible material and folded over, in and around itself; the second was of a set of drums that was a duplicate in scale, material and behavior. My experience of his art, which I would argue stems from his imagination as well as whatever part of his intellect that may have played into it, was that it defied my usual sense of what a fan and set of drums ordinarily “should” do and behave like. The function of both of these objects was challenged on the basis of how we “should” understand them. In my opinion, if there is one thing for certain that this “experience” didn’t do for me it was to suggest that “truth” was one of its premises. In fact, I would say that what it challenged was perception; visual perception and conceptual perception.
I believe that if there is anything that philosophy tries to enter into in when establishing its focus it’s a dialogue with truth. And though it is possible to use ideas about truth that may turn our usual perceptions upside down to get there, what it does not do is ignore “facts.” In this particular example I would argue that although there are fans and drum sets in the world, and that is a fact, we cannot compare Oldenberg’s examples with similar fans and drum sets because they only exist in his imagination. Now, I suppose we could say that now that we have seen them they have become “facts” in the world, I would strongly suggest that that kind of thinking would lead us into a circular situation not unlike Russel’s “Theory of Types.” We have simply created a sub set of an imagined set of circumstances. And to make matters worse, the sub set isn’t factual in any true sense. For as I understand logic, ideas are an extension of something that already exists in the world. The idea does not preface the thing in the world. What I think we have here in your comment is something that comes closer to art. So when I hear you apply the terms “imagination. experience, and seeing to your perception I am wary as to how some concept of truth based on fact can exist. I am trying to identify what I understand here so as to find a way out of talking in some circular manner. I think premising an argument on the basis of subjective as opposed to objective facts can lead us into a circular discussion. Because I can come up with a number of abstract concepts related to my experience, imagination, and perception that I am sure will be quite different from yours. Then we begin to enter the area of opinion; a far remove from truth. Just a thought.
Hola! I am enjoying our conversation as well! While I was in Chicago I read a new publication by Ray Monk entitled "How to Read Wittgenstein," published in 2005. It completely jells with my understanding of the Tractatus and the eventual need to write the Philosophical Investigations. W's move away fro the idea of philosophy as a "science" was right on the mark. The most interesting view that Monk brings to light, for me at least, is that W never lost his belief in an absolute "truth." And when Monk places it in the context of W's recognition of the "primitive" basis for language and the "connections" inherent in communication it really shines. The best part for me ,however, was w's recognition of the "Ubersicht." a characterization of the significant role that the arts of literature, poetry, painting, and music have to the relationship to W's understanding of "truth."
I also bought a book on some of the fundamental thoughts of Husserl so I can get a better grasp on your observations. I hope to get back to you soon. I really enjoyed your last comments. I printed them out and reread them a few times while I was away.
Oh! I forgot to mention that one of the early characterizations of one sense of Husserl's views was one that had to do with his insistence on the inability of "the science of psychology" to bring any meaningful results to philosphy, and in fact found it repugnant in that way. Interestingly, W finally concluded the same about "science" when he wrote the PI. Also interesting is that W did not consider Freudian psycholgy a science. What he felt was Freud's contribution was creating a mythology. One that W felt much more appropriate as to the necessity to understand the "primitive" nature of language that he so deftly probes in the PI.
Anyway, more later.
best,
dan
Also some great stuff on why W would use an example like "Two" this or "Two" that. The example Monk uses has to do with the "Five red apples." I'll explain later.
You have sent some very thoughtful and thought out comments. I truly appreciate the effort you bring to our conversation. Please keep in mind that I do not have the same background as you do. But I will try and be as thoughtful as you are.
I will comment on Witt and the arts as well as the five apples. My thoughts on those ideas are an extension of what I read in Monk's recent contribution to Witts philosophy. I also will try and respond directly to some of the ideas that you mentioned. I have already been caught up in the word "colors" that you used to identify an issue with personal experience. My focus is on the reification of the word as to nouns, adjectives, adverbs and the like. Also to a sense of synesthesia (sp) that I see as a correlation to that. And how all of that gives me a direction as to some of the issues regarding perception that you raise.
But............the Chicago Bear game is my primary focus this afternoon.
And...I will get back soon.
I would like to mention something about what I referred to in an early comment to you about Witt. and his "pursuit." It was a comment I made about how "life" enters into my reading of his Tractatus.
I am in complete agreement with you as to the PI being a much more thought out philosophy about language. His reflection upon the errors he made in the Tract. were certainly justified by his further understanding of the role of "private languages." I commented that I found his "pursuit" of truth in the Tract. more interesting. I think that in the Tract. we have a good example of the kind of "private language" that Witt. would agree doesn't work. I think that is why sometimes it is so hard to understand what he means (although I think that is finally being sorted out and I think it was because of the PI that we now understand the Tract.)
But as he formulated further how "private language" does work I think he hit on the correct approach. I think his personality when writing the Tract. really shines through. There is no question as to the eccentric behavior that he displayed while writing it. It was almost as if he was hanging on to a very small corner of his mind that was trying to reason with itself. The Tract. for me is a wonderful example of not only creativity in all its strangeness but also a terrific example of a way to survive one's ghost's. Of course there is always the danger of going over the edge so to speak, but that didn't happen in this case. Instead, what we know, is that he went on to finally come to grips with "reality" as I think aligns itself much more closely to how the world and language work. I have no pretensions as to the absoluteness of any of the results he came up with but I think as we have seen, his results from the PI have generated a myriad of observations and writing that seems to me to be moving philosophy closer to it's intended purpose; communal life. Reason, seems to me to be the arbitrator of all this and I think it is starting to play itself out in many variations of philosophy and art. Interestingly, Stephen Toulmin, his former student and co author along with Alan Janik of "Wittggenstein's Vienna," in 2001 wrote a book "entitled "Return to Reason." It is an interesting book in that I hear Toulmin challenging many of his own earlier views as to the relationship of science to philosophy, one of Witts. major contributions to understanding the role of "logic" as a science; which he insisted it was not. ( I agree of course)
Patrick: As to the section on “private language” Ray Monk in his most recent book, “How to Read Wittgenstein,” Norton pub., 2005, observes that “Some people hold that its target is the entire tradition of Western Philosophy from the early modern period inaugurated by Descartes to the middle of the twentieth century.” Indeed, Wittgenstein’s greatest achievement, it is often said, was to have undone 300 years of Cartesianism.”
Monk also goes on to point out that there are those who dismiss that idea because Witt had never read Descartes and in fact seemed to dismiss him offhandedly. Those proponents instead allude to Witt’s “private language argument as a stab at Russell’s acknowledgment of the possibility of a private language in his lecture on logical atomism given in 1918.
Without going into the details as to why this was highly improbable according to Monk, (and I agree with him) Monk states that in his view “…it is best to forget that these sections of the Philosophical Investigations – which contain some of the most innovative metaphors (the metaphor idea stressed by Monk is something that really interested me!)and some of the most inspired writing of the entire book – are supposed to constitute a single sustained argument. They quite clearly do not. Rather they are attempts to approach from a variety of different angles various assumptions about private, “inner” experience that are customarily made by professional philosophers and ordinary people alike.”
I am going to quote in its entirety the remainder of what Monk has surmised on this topic. After reading your response, if I understood you correctly, we may have miscommunicated as to whether I believe in “private languages” or not. Let me say upfront that I do not! The point I was trying to make when I mentioned the Tractatus was that I think the Tractatus, to some degree, is the kind of private language that can result in difficult if not impossible understanding. And I mentioned the PI as an example of a totally different approach by what I perceive as a person (Witt) whose personality was beginning to conform to a more realistic approach to language and therefore life in general. And that the writing of the PI was what give us a clearer understanding of the Tractatus.
Anyway, I will try and clear this up by going on a little further with Monk’s observations:
“ For example, it is not at all unusual, even outside philosophy seminar rooms, to hear people say things like ‘only I can know whether I am really in pain: another person can only surmise it.’…To say this is to forget the “triviality” of which Wittgenstein reminds us: “ if we are using the word “to know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?) then other people very often know when I am in pain.’ If we then start talking about the certainty with which we know our own pain, then we need to be shown that what prompts such talk is a confusion between a grammatical remark and a material one. ‘ One plays patience by oneself’ is a grammatical remark. ‘I went to the cinema and saw the film myself’ is a material remark. The first might be used to explain to somebody what kind of a game patience is. Similarly the sentence ‘Sensations are private’ is a grammatical remark; it says what kind of things sensations are, it does not, e.g., report a possible discovery about sensations.”
“There is a tendency – and again, like the ‘picture of the essence of human language’ discernable in Augustine’s description of how he learned to speak, this is a pre- philosophical tendency rather than a philosophical opinion – to think that the private is somehow logically prior to the public. ‘ I know what I see, think, feel, etc.,’ it is common to believe, ‘ but I have to infer what you or anybody else is seeing, thinking, feeling, etc.’ One of Wittgenstein’s aims in the Philosophical Investigations is to show the incoherence of this picture of the relative priority of the private and the public. This is the point of the famous ‘beetle in the box…’ The thing, (the beetle or whatever) to which only I have access cannot be the meaning – or even the reference – of words that have a public use. And, as words like ‘belief,’ ‘desire,’ ‘intention,’ ‘thought,’etc. undeniably have a public use, it follows that neither their reference nor their meaning can possibly be something essentially private.”
I think the above relates very strongly to some of the examples you sent. Again, I’m not a philosopher but Monk’s observations seem reasonable to me. I hadn’t planned on getting back to you so soon but I didn’t want us to go too far astray in trying to understand one another.
Patrick, I think I can understand your student's concern with focusing on so many details. It is easy to miss the forest for the trees as they say. I too, in my teaching days could find myself moving into thoughts that would excite me in such a manner that the need to make sure I cover all the bases got across. I finally had to learn that my students needed to come to that kind of a process on their own; that giving them the more general idea of things didn't brig up anxieties that would cause them not to look at all. Nevertheless, I do empathize with your process. It can be fun and at the same time very revealing in our exploration of ideas. But...as I mentioned a while back, those are really the little "Ghost's" that I visit.
In any case, I enjoyed your response.
I thought we already agreed that Witt refuted the Tractatus as a final resolve. The statement you quote is from the Tractatus. I'm perplexed why this is going in circles. Who was this prof anyway? And what has he written that could put a more detailed explanation as to what "He" means by language? I think Monk made it quite clear that the PI shed all the light we need to know as to how and why Witt refuted the Tractatus and why the PI's section on "private language" makes sense. Anyway, that's my thought on the matter until proven otherwise.
Thanks for the thought though.
Hey, read the articles I mentioned. I'm looking foorward to your thoughts on them.
AHA! I knew you would have something perceptive to say.
I think what Brunnetti is referring to when he speaks of the "edge" is some metaphorical relationship to how it is used in the painting and how that corresponds to some idea I have about reality and illusion in "real time." I think that is the comparison that he is alluding to in his use of Beckett as a basis of comparison. Ultimately, I think what he is dealing with, at least I would hope he is, is perception, both physical and conceptual. If he is, then he is coming very close to some of the issues that inform my work. That's just a guess on my part but I do know john's writing and he has never come across as someone who has a formula by which he expresses his thoughts on a given subject.
Thanks for the comment. I am very interested on how you will respond to the two essays that I mentioned.
I think my work from Spain is finally in the U.S. I'll know more today. Hopefully then I can spend more time on art and related issues like the one we are having.
Patrick: "...spiritual cartography!" Very poetic! What a wonderful way of placing into context all that you said preceding it and after. I am very impressed. I think your explorations in philosophy (esp. perception) bring a special kind of insight into my work. Thanks for taking the time to read it.
I want to respond briefly to what you said in an earlier email about the prof. who found it "almost impossible to know what he (Witt) means by language."
Every text I have ever read on Witt, including Ray Monk's most recent, characterizes Witt's definition of language as "a picture of the world." And that it reveals "the sum total of the world" as a "model" of reality. Now that's a characterization that is consistent. It is very hard for me to understand how the prof. you mention doesn't understand that as well.
Now...this prof may disagree with that assessment of Witts premise. But to say that Witt doesn't tell us, and I think categorically, what language is, I think is a mistaken view. One may not agree with Witt's observations, and as we know Witt himself refuted some of it, but the only way to understand where Witt is coming from is to accept his premise, acknowledge that it had a conclusion, and go on from there.
As to how to interpret the idea of "representations" as being trivial or whatever, it seems to me that we need to find a way to agree on how to understand "representations" in the context of Witt's extension of his logic as to "pictures." I must admit that I am not qualified to comment in any way as to the argument as to whether Witt's conclusions align with reality or whatever. But...I do think I understand that he knew what he (Witt) meant by "language" and that he was very clear on it. I think that is why so much of what I have read in that regard is so consistently the same as I stated above.
jubfjhPatrick, very interesting. Your perceptions open some interesting ways to try and connect some of the questions you raise. I thought that your comments as to Aquinas and Witt's idea of "silence" was very fresh. I've never thought of the two together in the way you mentioned. Very interesting!
As we move along I will try and accommodate your request for some images with dimensions etc. I will set up a seperate link to a blog page that will contain some of the images that might be helpful to you. I will inform you as to when they are posted.
Again, keep in mind that I also work in the studio along with (like you I'm sure) a myriad of other responsibilities so there will be times when there is a little time gap in our communication.
I should also tell you that there is one particular philosopher aside from Witt and Toulmin that has had a direct impact on my thinking; Roger Scrutton. I reread two essays in particular from his "Modern Philosophy: an introduction and survey," on a regular basis. The essays are "Perception" and Imagination." They come closest to suggesting ways to look at some of the things that interest me from the conceptual side of my work. I've never found it necessary to understand the "how" or "why" of actually "making" my art so much as to appreciate why it ends up "looking" the way that it does and how that "look" corresponds to what my perception was of what inspired the work itself. I have always considered my self a romantic; not necessarily in the philosophical vein as defined in 19th century German Romanticsm, although there may be some correlation, but from a more contemporary position in defiance of the so called "Logical Positivist" attitude that seems to look at the world from a very "clean" point of view. I know that the "Logical Positivist" position is pretty much passe but I still see my own role as an artist needing to come to terms with all the little devils that being creative tosses into the process. Those are just some of the "Ghost's" that I was referring to in an earlier discussion we where having about Witt and the evolution of the Tractatus.
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